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RESUMO Nos anos 90, vários fatores afetaram a estrutura e o padrão de concorrên-
cia do mercado bancário, diluindo barreiras representadas pelas nações. Em pri-
meiro plano, encontram-se medidas de liberalização e desregulamentação. Em se-
gundo, tem-se o progresso tanto na tecnologia de processamento de dados quanto
nas técnicas de administração de riscos. Desencadeou-se um processo de consoli-
dação do setor, com a constituição de grandes grupos provedores de amplo leque
de produtos, o que, em muitos países, convergiu para a desnacionalização bancária.
É possível uma série de efeitos positivos e negativos, seja para os demandantes de
serviços financeiros, seja para as economias como um todo, impondo às autorida-
des responsáveis novos desafios para combinar pressão concorrencial com estabili-
dade sistêmica.
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WORLDWIDE CONCENTRATION IN THE BANKING SECTOR:
CAUSES AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS
ABSTRACT During the 90s, several factors affected the market structure and the
standard of competition in the banking system, diluting barriers represented by
country frontiers. First there were measures directed toward liberalization and de-
regulation. Secondly, there were technological innovations in data processing and
risk management. A process of industry consolidation got under way with the for-
mation of large banking groups that provided a wide range of products and finan-
cial services, which converged in many countries towards banking denationaliza-
tion. It is possible to identify a number of positive and negative effects thereof,
whether for those requiring financial services or for economies as a whole, implying
new challenges for authorities in their pursuit of an atmosphere of competition
combined with one of systemic stability.
Key words: international financial markets, goverment policy and regulations,
mergers, acquisitions, restructuring, corporate governance
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INTRODUCTION
Since the early 80s, an intense acceleration in the international trade of
products and services has taken place and deepened the economic integra-
tion amongst countries. If in 1987 the international trade of goods repre-
sented 21% of the world product, in 1997 it reached 30% (World Bank,
1999). In the period 1990-1998 alone, world product grew at an average rate
of 3.2% p.a., while international trade during the same period, in terms of
volume, expanded at a rate of 6.4% p.a. (International Monetary Fund —
IMF 1999). One of the consequences of this expansion was a growing de-
mand for financial services in the international sphere. In order to meet this
demand, the suppliers of those services, especially banks, also increased
their degree of “internationalization”, which included the opening of new
branches abroad. This is the traditional explanation for the international-
ization of banks: an offshoot of the transnationalization of companies in the
productive sector and of the increase in international trade (Aliber, 1984;
Claessens et alii, 1998).
However, in disagreement with this view, we start out from the principle
that internationalization cannot be understood without due attention to
the dynamics of competition between financial service corporations and to
the process of increasing the value of capital in the financial sphere. After
all, the recent stronger growth in the flows of international financial capital
indicates that the deepening of economic integration amongst countries has
been more intense in the financial sphere than in the commercial one.
There is a growing interlacing of the various national capital markets
(shares, derivatives and other securities), with a consequent formation of
truly global markets (Vasconcelos, 1998; Ayuso & Blanco, 2000).
This context has provided new business opportunities for both potential
users of financial services and their suppliers, who compete for a world
market with annual incomes above US$ 2 trillion (The Economist, 1999).
The competition for these incomes requires and favors the formation of
large institutions of suppliers of financial services, modifying market struc-
ture not only in the international sphere but also in the national ones. As a
result, spurred by the entrance of foreign institutions, several national
banking-financial systems are undergoing modifications in their market
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structures and their patterns of competition. A marked banking concentra-
tion can also be perceived, though the potential outcomes of this are as yet
little understood.
With this scenario in mind, the present paper aims to present the world
process of banking concentration, discussing its causes and potential effects
through an examination of international experiences observed in various
countries. The paper is organized as follows: in the first section we discuss
the recent banking concentration in various regional markets as well as in
the international market as a whole, and some of its main causes. Next we
analyze possible consequences of this banking concentration, including the
presentation of some problems referring to systemic risk. In section three
we seek to examine the process of banking internationalization and dena-
tionalization along with its possible effects. Lastly, in the fourth section, we
offer some brief final considerations.
1. BANKING CONCENTRATION
During the 90s, a broad movement of mergers and acquisitions was noted
in the sector of financial services. That process of concentration was taking
place both within the frontiers of many countries and in the international
sphere, i.e., through national and crossborder mergers and acquisitions. In
recent years, this process was intensified through the emergence of
megamergers, including those involving firms from different countries (see
tables 1 and 2 in the Annex).1  Consequently, a consolidation and concen-
tration of the sector has been going on through the formation of large fi-
nancial conglomerates, many of which operate on a global level. Such phe-
nomenon has taken place in several countries with different degrees of
economic development and financial structure, thus showing its worldwide
character. Some data illustrating this process of concentration are displayed
in tables 4 and 5 in the Annex. As we try to show, this movement reflects a
search by financial institutions of competitive advantages, especially those
coming from economies of scale and scope, as well as a search for “market
power”.
In the United States, the number of banking institutions was reduced by
30% between 1988 and 1997, mainly as a consequence of a process of merg-
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ers and acquisitions that reached an average of 510 per year (Brewer III et
al., 2000). During that period, the 8 major institutions increased their share
in total banking assets from 22.3% to 35.5% (Berger et alii, 1999).2  In Eu-
rope, prodded by the Single European Act of 1986 and chiefly by the Second
Banking Co-ordination Directive of 1989, several financial institutions be-
came involved in some sort of merger or acquisition operations with other
institutions in the continent (Shearlock, 1999), causing the number of
banks and other credit institutions to drop in nearly all countries in the re-
gion (table 4).
Nevertheless, the process of mergers and acquisitions in the financial
sector has not been restricted to the banking universe. Banks have also been
aggressive towards non-banking financial institutions. During recent years,
insurance and pension companies have been the preferential targets of
banking groups. This occurs because, with the aging of the population, the
accentuation of uncertainties regarding the economic future of families,
due to the possibility of unemployment or a worsening of working condi-
tions and to the dismantling of public social security systems in several
countries, insurance companies have shown a better performance in terms
of profitability and income expansion than the average observed in the
banking sector, making them interesting targets for large banking groups
aiming to widen the supply of products and services to their customers. Ex-
amples of this type of action are Credit Suisse and Winterthut (Switzer-
land); SE-Banken and Trygg Hansa (Sweden); Halifax and Clerical & Medi-
cal (UK); Citibank and Travelers Insurance (USA).3
Many are the causes or motivations for the process of consolidation in
the financial sector. There are both those related to changes in the supply
conditions and those related to demand. On the supply side, technological
improvements (in data processing and transfer) and financial innovations
(derivatives and risk management systems) seem to have increased the po-
tential for exploitation of economies of scale and scope in the financial “in-
dustry” (Tiner, 1999). Thus, if studies made with data of the 80s did not
point to the existence of significant scale economies in the financial sector4 ,
more recent works, incorporating data of the 90s and therefore, the effects
of technological progress in the period, offer positive evidence of the pres-
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ence of such economies.5 At this point, construction and management costs
related to complex products (e.g., derivative pricing systems or electronic
networks for real time payments and transfers) can be diluted amongst vari-
ous customers.6  In the same sense, the development of forms of electronic
payment systems (debit cards or other forms of electronic currency) also
demands high capital investments (for the setup of electronic payment and
settlement networks) and presents significant gains of scale. This represents
an additional competitive advantage for large banking institutions with re-
spect to their smaller competitors, and a force that presses toward the pro-
cess of bank mergers.
Being very intensive in information, the financial services sector has re-
ceived a direct and strong impact from innovations taking place in the areas
of information technologies and communications (Levine, 1997; Tiner,
1999). Firms with worldwide competitive strategies were greatly benefited,
since they obtained a reduction costs and lead times in both their data
transaction and the processing/transmission of information. At the same
time, the growing sophistication of the market, with the development of
new instruments and financial products (mechanisms of securitization and
derivatives, instantaneous clearing networks, etc.) and the need for complex
systems of risk evaluation led to a need for firms that might be capable of
supplying a wide range of services simultaneously in different markets, in
order to dilute the high investment costs required to maintain competitive-
ness. Consequently, financial corporations restricted to national or regional
areas and with their business concentrated in the supply of a set of tradi-
tional financial services should find it increasingly difficult to remain in the
market. This also results from a growing predominance of financial busi-
nesses in major international financial centers, in which many types of as-
sets find more liquidity and better and safer systems of commercialization.
Hence, with the development of technologies for collecting and process-
ing technical financial information, banks and other financial institutions
have become more efficient in their evaluation of potential risks involved in
their operations through standardized techniques (credit-scoring techni-
ques), thereby achieving more favorable conditions to expand their opera-
tions even to regions or sectors in which they had not yet gained expertise
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from practical experience (through processes such as learning by doing or
any other learning method) (Stiglitz, 1987; 1989; May 1989; Celarier, 1998).
For instance, with the development of credit classification systems, the ca-
pacity of large banks to handle credit operations of small values was ex-
panded, minimizing problems arising from information asymmetry and
leveling the informational advantage held until then by banks acting in
more specialized and local fields. Changes in the technologies directly re-
lated to the supply of financial services seem also to have provided substan-
tial scale gains benefiting large institutions. Service systems provided by
telephone and/or through the world wide web are clear examples of that
evolution (Radecki, Wenninger & Orlow, 1997; Tiner, 1999).7
The fact that financial institutions need to rearrange their organizations
in order to meet new demands from customers is another motivation for the
process of consolidation of the financial sector.8 Corporate customers (mul-
tinational companies, pension funds etc.) seem to prefer to concentrate their
business with a small number of financial institutions, be that for reasons of
transaction costs reduction, or to prevent private information from being
handed over to a large number of external agents. In addition, as these
agents, most especially large corporations, have diversified their financial
portfolios with assets issued in different currencies, it has proved fundamen-
tal for banks to be able to offer evaluations and services to clients in several
national markets, thus forcing them to expand their operations globally.
The Bank’s desire to diversify their risks by sector should not be under-
rated either. Diversification of products, services, and consequently clients
allows financial institutions to reach a better combination of risk and return
expectations, even if this may mean higher risk levels, including those diffi-
cult to evaluate ex-ante.9 Corroborating this statement, empiric evidence
shows that financial institutions consolidated in processes of mergers/ac-
quisitions tend to expand the range of their assets and form a more diversi-
fied portfolio, which also means a diversification of their risks.10 The mere
territorial and/or geographical expansion of a banking institution allows it
to build more trustworthy models for the management of credit and market
risks, due to the possibility of expansion and diversification of its data base,
which gives it a wider vision of general business conditions. Furthermore,
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even managers of financial institutions, in order to protect their jobs (and
emulate expansive strategies of other institutions),11 seem to tend to look
for a wider risk diversification (May, 1995) or to defensive mergers and ac-
quisitions (Hadlock el alii, 1999), even if this may not represent the most lu-
crative strategy for the institution and its shareholders.
Another point highlighted in the literature is the search by banks for bet-
ter conditions to make use of the security networks supplied by govern-
ments (Saunders & Wilson, 1999). In general, large financial institutions are
favored by their condition of being too big to fail, having for this reason
privileged access to government help (discount windows, deposit insur-
ance, support in merger processes, special credit lines etc.) in comparison
with smaller institutions (Aglietta, 1998; Van’t Dack, 1998; Eichengren,
1999). There is also evidence that the desire of these institutions to reach a
higher market capitalization stimulates in many cases the merger with or
acquisition of other corporations (The Economist, 1999; Steward, 1998).
Consequently, shareholders and financial institutions put pressure for these
deals to happen because of their understanding that this will increase the
value of their shares. In addition, higher market capitalization allows finan-
cial institutions to acquire “strategic flexibility”, giving them better condi-
tions for external financing through the capital market and, as a result, to
continue advancing positions in a market that presents an ever growing
competition, even in the international sphere (Sherlock, 1998).
The increase in capitalization of banking institutions through the pro-
cesses of association (graphic 1) takes place due to investors’ expectations
regarding gains of efficiency and/or market power, which will permit larger
profits in the future. This occurs because through such processes banks are
able to get greater market shares and considerable cost reductions, signifi-
cantly improving their cost/income ratio (efficiency ratio). As an example,
the association between Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank and Manufac-
turers Hanover provided the resulting group with cost reductions in the
range of US$ 2.5 billion per year (The Economist, 1999). The announce-
ment of the merger of the Swiss Bank Corporation with the Union Bank of
Switzerland, in December 1997, was spurred by the expectation of a reduc-
tion of close to 13 thousand jobs and 20% in costs in the first three years
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(Euromoney, 1998). Likewise, the merger in September 1997 of the German
banks Bayerische Hypobank and Bayerische Vereinsbank was expected to
attain a yearly economy of US$ 562 million, thanks to the resulting cost re-
duction (Euromoney, 1998).
Finally, one cannot reject the possibility that the wave of mergers and ac-
quisitions between financial institutions may also be fed by the desire of
their managers to increase their own salaries. As shown by Bliss and Rosen
(1999), the earnings of the directors of these institutions generally rise in the
period after the association, in accordance with the principle that bigger fi-
nancial corporations offer their managers higher compensation (Demsetz
& Saidenberg, 1999).
A close analysis shows that such causes act not alone but jointly, mutu-
ally reinforcing each other in the majority of the cases, providing forces in
favor of associations that surpass existing barriers, including those found in
mergers and acquisitions between institutions of equal size. As described
theoretically and empirically in many texts on the theory of organizations,
due to the similar size of institutions that associate and to the rivalry that
can emerge from that, the obstacles to a process of aggregation of institu-
tions of similar size are higher, because of the presence of strong manage-
ment and organizational culture conflicts.12
However, it is necessary to underline that such opportunities and incen-
tives towards consolidation would not have been exploited if the regulation
standards of the financial sector enforced in different countries up until the
70s had prevailed. It was the deregulation observed in the sector that set off
the process of consolidation back in the 70s and 80s (First Banking Coordi-
nation Directive of 1977 and Second Banking Coordination Directive of 1989,
in European Union countries; Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 and several
changes in state laws during this period in the USA) and that gave it a new
impulse and dimension in the 90s (effective implementation of Second
Directive, 1993/94, in the European Union; Riegle-Neal Act, 1994, and
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999, in the USA, as well as the “Big Bang” initi-
ated in Japan in 1997). Therefore, under a general policy of financial liberal-
ization, the changes in North American, Japanese and European legislation
allowed their financial institutions to carry out a process of consolidation
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via intra and inter-sectorial mergers and acquisitions with local and foreign
corporations (see tables 1 and 3; Shearlock, 1999).
In other words, the suppliers of financial services try to benefit from the
deregulation of the sector and from the opportunities which emerge there-
from, given the possibilities of financial gains, in many cases immediate,13
that can in general be anticipated for the shares of the firms involved in the
processes of mergers or acquisitions. This also accounts for a large number
of financial corporation associations from different countries and for an in-
crease in the contestability of several national financial markets, even ex-
plaining part of those mergers and acquisitions inside domestic markets as a
way for domestic financial institutions to become larger and discourage the
entry and further growth of potential foreign competitors (tables 2 and 3).
Nonetheless, it should be noted that many countries have witnessed sev-
eral rounds of financial deregulation and government incentives to consoli-
date the financial sector, including spurs toward, the entrance of foreign in-
stitutions either after or during periods of financial crisis (Caprio &
Klingebiel, 1996). Thus, besides exposing their own deficiencies or the
sector’s fragilities as a whole, as well as the reductions in the price of firms
which occur in those periods of difficulties, financial crises are a favorable
time for reforming the financial system, as during those periods there is a
weakening of the mechanisms of political resistance of both domestic finan-
cial institutions and the society at large (Kane, 1996; Kroszner, 1999).
Hence, an important factor giving impulse to changes in financial and
banking regulations is the desire of governments to incite the strengthening
of the domestic financial institutions (Kono & Schuknecht, 1998; Taylor,
1998; Tamirisa et alii, 2000).
Therefore, in spite of the “national pride” in having large financial insti-
tutions (Boot, 1999), the technical basis behind such measures is the per-
ception that these institutions have a better chance to survive in periods of
financial instability, when compared to smaller ones. There is evidence that
in the face of a financial crisis, a reduction in the supply of credit, which can
deepen the crisis, is greater in the case of smaller banking institutions,
whereas larger ones may  act as cushions and avoid the collapse of this sup-
ply (Hancock & Wilcox, 1998). This point is very important especially for
financial markets in developing countries, as many of them have in recent
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years suffered the effects of a series of financial crises (Aglietta, 1998;
Celarier, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000; Eichengreen, 1999). In such cases, not only do
governments tend to press for an association of domestic financial institu-
tions, but also, and sometimes predominantly, tend to create incentives to
the entry of foreign institutions, seeking to strengthen domestic financial
markets and to create wider and more stable channels for the flow of inter-
national credit (Goldberg et alii, 2000).
It can be emphasized that the technological innovations which occurred
in the banking sector, whether on the asset or the liability side of their op-
erations have given impulse to deregulation by governments, as they intro-
duced new difficulties and challenges into the task of controlling financial
operations (Kroszner & Strahan, 1997). They also strengthened the posi-
tions of those who defended financial deregulation and of potential local
users of the international financial services market (Kroszner, 1999).
2. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF BANKING CONCENTRATION
The current world process of mergers and acquisitions discerned in the fi-
nancial services industry can increase the market power of financial institu-
tions, giving them, in some national and/or regional spheres, greater capac-
ity to determine the value of their services, especially when considering
those agents whose needs cannot be satisfied by institutions which are not
located close by. In general, this is the case of retail customers with small de-
posits or loans (Kwast, Starr-McCluer & Wolken, 1997; Kwast, 1999). As
some studies show (Berger & Hannan, 1989; Hannan, 1991, 1994; Jackson,
1997), more concentrated financial and banking markets are not beneficial
to small customers, given that the rates of interest paid on investments are
lower and the costs of loans are higher in comparison to those of markets
with a lesser degree of concentration. Nevertheless, accepting the existence
of potential economies of scale and scope in basic banking operations, the
increase in the size of banks implies gains in efficiency that will reduce oper-
ating costs. Consequently, one cannot discard the possibility that this re-
duction will imply a decrease in banking spreads, thus providing better
credit conditions and/or a higher remuneration on deposits for banking
services customers.
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Another positive effect of banking concentration, also with a cost de-
creasing potential, may come from a reduction of the expected risks of
banking operations. This reduction would be obtained with the increase of
sectorial, geographical and product diversification achieved by consoli-
dated financial suppliers. Certainly, in order to know if such ex-ante cost
reductions will or will not be passed on to customers of financial services,
whether in the form of lower costs or quality improvement, will depend on
the market structure emerging from this process of consolidation and espe-
cially on the level of competition the sector, imposed not only by market
forces but also by the actions of regulatory agents, i.e., as a result both of
“pure” market and institutional factors.
Hence, two aspects should be examined in estimating the impact of bank-
ing-financial concentration on the prices paid by customers: first of all, we
must determine if this concentration will increase the efficiency of newly
consolidated institutions, which leads to discussing whether or not there will
be economies of scale and scope to be reaped even by large financial con-
glomerates; secondly, we must determine if those gains of efficiency will tend
to be passed on to potential clients, whether through price reductions (lower
cost of loans, higher earnings on deposits, reduction of tariffs and taxes for
various services) or through a growth in the supply of new services.14 This
relates to whether or not there are elements in the market generating com-
petitive pressures, even when the financial services sector, after passing
through a process consolidation, amplifies its degree of concentration.
With regard to the first aspect, evidence in several countries favors the
hypothesis that a consolidation between financial institutions will promote
cost reductions in the supply of traditional products and services (Resti,
1998; Rhoades, 1998; Fried et alii, 1999; Haynes & Thompson, 1999). This
can be perceived, for example, as a greater efficiency of consolidated institu-
tions capable of supplying multiple products and services through common
channels and systems of distribution, management, marketing, and ac-
counting. In this respect, several papers (Jayaratne & Strahan, 1998; Strahan
& Weston, 1998; Berger et alii, 1998) indicate that from the process of con-
centration onwards there is (given an appropriate time span) a tendency
toward a reduction in the prices of loans simultaneously to an expansion of
the supply of credit, especially for small credit-takers.
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However, it is important to stress the possibility that at first the opposite
will take place if large banks acquire smaller ones in a hostile manner
(which most often implies changes in the former corporation manage-
ment). In this case, a curtail in the supply of credit to small borrowers can
occur until the new controllers are able to properly evaluate the risks in-
volved in those operations, as many of them depend on information ob-
tained through a direct relationship between the parties (Berger et al.,
1995). Likewise, we cannot discard the possibility that when banks increase
their capacity in order to leverage resources and work with more complex
products and services they will move toward giving priority to the wholesale
operations required by their large customers, as these offer better possibili-
ties to “add value” as well as smaller risks. Smaller customers are thus rel-
egated to a secondary role also for reasons of organizational “diseconomies”
(Williamson, 1988). After all, the organizational profile necessary to meet
the needs of large customers is different from that required for small and
medium size customers. In general, being unable to compete in more so-
phisticated markets that cater to the needs of large customers, small finan-
cial institutions end up specializing in the supply of simpler products and
services mostly required by smaller customers. In most cases, such opera-
tions call for a close relationship between suppliers and users of the service,
not least because this enables the former to obtain information allowing for
an evaluation of the risks involved for example in loans requested by the lat-
ter (Mester Nakamura & Renault, 1998; Cole, 1998).
Validating these statements, some studies carried out on data from the
North American banking market (Keeton, 1995; Levonian & Soller, 1996)
reinforce the conclusion that large banks relegate catering to small clients to
a secondary plane. In the case of Italy, upon examining the process of merg-
ers and acquisitions in the banking sector, Sapienza (1998) has also con-
cluded that consolidated corporations, especially when large institutions
were involved, reduced their credit portfolio to small debtors. Notwith-
standing that, one cannot eliminate the possibility that as a reaction other
banking institutions may come to supply this market niche and to specialize
in providing credit to small economic agents. Although one cannot general-
ize this assertion with respect to many countries, Goldberg and White
(1998) and De Young, Goldberg and White (1999) show that this is hap-
pening in the USA.
38  R. Econ. contemp., Rio de Janeiro, 6(1): 25-56, jan./jun. 2002
On the other hand, if there is empiric evidence that consolidated corpo-
rations become more efficient in terms of costs,15 there is also evidence that
they start supplying more complex and sophisticated products and services,
hence increasing their total costs (Berger & Mester, 1999). Such products
and services are demanded mainly by large customers, who form the whole-
sale market of financial institutions and generally have plenty of access to
international financial markets. Nonetheless, it is precisely in the wholesale
market that the negative impacts of concentration are fewer and the positive
effects of deregulation in terms of competitive pressure are more numerous,
due to the fact that location advantages are almost nonexistent (Gande et
alii, 1999). This being the case, financial institutions can adopt a differenti-
ated margin profit policy in order to pass on some of the costs incurred in
their wholesale operations to the prices of their retail products and services.
They would therefore be in a better position to either protect or amplify
their operations in the one market that offers a greater degree of contest-
ability, that is to say, the wholesale market. On the other hand, with the con-
tinuation of the crossborder consolidation of financial institutions and its
consequent reduction in the number of institutions operating in the global
market, one cannot eliminate the possibility of an increase in the power of
suppliers in relation to users of financial services even in this wholesale
market.
This leads us to a second aspect. It is certainly true that for consumers of
financial services (especially small ones) to benefit from these possible cost
reductions in conventional products and services, banking concentration
would have to take place simultaneously with an increase in the sector’s
level of competition, both in the retail market (small and medium custom-
ers) and in the wholesale one (corporate clients or holders of large for-
tunes). Although at first sight this may seem paradoxical, the process could
be explained by either using the view that competition between capitals un-
der general conditions is never ending, even amongst large capitals,16 or by
those cases in which governments try to promote policies that increase mar-
ket contestability (François & Schuknecht, 1999) by curtailing sectorial bar-
riers to entry and/or exit. Hence, there is arguably a possibility that a reduc-
tion of competition within the sector could be taking place, with larger
institutions increasing their capacity to fix prices, and that significant gains
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in efficiency are being achieved through economies of scale. But the oppo-
site view can also be upheld, namely, specifically with regard to financial
sector conditions, that the sector is benefiting from economies of scale and
scope (Hufbauer & Warren, 1999) and therefore having an opportunity
both to reduce the costs of financial services and to increase the “fire power”
of large international financial institutions (mega-corporations) in a mar-
ket under rapid concentration and transformation, partly owing to techno-
logical development. Consequently, in a market with such characteristics,
an increase rather than a reduction seems to be taking place  in the competi-
tion between different capitals, since if the latter were true the market would
be relatively stagnated and mature.
This argument seems to be supported by the state of affairs in USA, where
the antitrust policy applied to the banking sector is similar to that applied to
any other industrial sector, although a review of the antitrust policy in the
banking sector literature is beyond the scope of this paper. So, general guide-
lines follow the Sherman Act (1890), the Clayton Act (1914), the U. S. Su-
preme Court decision involving Philadelphia National Bank in 1963, and the
Community Reinvestment Act (1977). Proposals for banking mergers are
surveyed by the FDIC (for non charted interstate banks) or the FED (charted
interstate banks) and decided upon by the Department of Justice.
These institutions assume that “a primary goal of banking antitrust
policy is to prevent the creation of, or an increase in, market power such
that a firm could impose above-competitive prices and earn excess profits at
the expense of consumers” (Cynark, 1998, p. 705).17 Nevertheless, it implies
a definition of geographical and product market boundaries which in the
last decade is being blurred by innovations in financial and information
technologies. Thus, market evolution is one more factor challenging such a
static approach to antitrust policy. But there still is no consensus in the spe-
cialized literature on this subject, for it is too early to foresee a clear trend in
the complex interrelationship between the developments of all these con-
tradictory forces.18
A decisive factor in the competitive and systemic effects of banking con-
centration is the action of regulatory agents. For a probable leitmotif for
banks to incorporate other corporations and increase their size, as formerly
indicated, is their search for the “too big to fail” condition (Saunders & Wil-
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son, 1999), which will theoretically give them easier access to the security
networks provided by governments. Another reason for this union between
financial institutions is their desire to diversify risks. Both leitmotivs are re-
lated to the question of systemic risk or, in other words, to the possibility
that liquidity or solvency problems within an institution will cause the same
problems in other institutions, thus contaminating and exposing the whole
financial and banking system to risk.
While accepting the hypothesis that consolidation of the financial ser-
vices industry implies the formation of large institutions that are therefore
more robust, the fact that these, as explained before, are subject to a higher
degree of risk and individually represent a significant market share increases
the possibility of systemic risk in case any of them should get into trouble,
even more so if we consider the possibility of a market generalization of the
“too big to fail” logic. Furthermore, as a large part of the merger and acqui-
sition process takes place under the “umbrella” of a bank (i.e., with a bank
as the head of the new bigger firm), when forming large financial services
conglomerates there is a greater possibility that financial sub-sectors tradi-
tionally not protected by government security networks (as insurance,
health and pension plans, finance companies etc.) will contaminate the
banking activities of those conglomerates. As a result, more resources and/
or better safety structures are required in order to prevent localized prob-
lems from contaminating other financial institutions in a scenario of sys-
temic risk. In other words, consolidation of the financial sector under the
auspices of banking groups increases the need for and the responsibilities of
the lender of last resort.
Hence, all these factors lead us to the well-known question of a moral
hazard: should such financial groups believe that they will be protected by
the government in case of financial difficulties, which means at least a partial
“socialization” of their losses, they may feel stimulated to increase their risk
preference in order to obtain higher yields. This implies the generation of
moral hazard problems, for there are incentives for such institutions to take
greater risks than they would if the “safety network” provided by govern-
ments were not available. As a consequence, there will tend to be an eleva-
tion of the systemic risk of the financial sector as a whole (Aglietta, 1998).
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One way to mitigate the moral hazard problem is to ask the agents re-
sponsible for the prudential regulation and supervision to settle clear and
rigid rules that explicitly limit the risks for several banking activities, condi-
tioning access to the government’s safety network to compliance to those
rules. Such action may thus discourage any particular trend towards risk.
However, ex-ante imposition of those aid rules to financial markets has
proven very difficult, whether because it is hard to settle them beforehand
and/or on account of market pressures for help times of hardship (we
shoukd also include in this last reason the risk that crises may spread be-
yond the financial market, i.e., to the entire economy). Some authors19 go
as far as to indicate that a certain degree of moral hazard is inherent to fi-
nancial contracts and to the activities of the lender of last resort.
If so, starting from an examination of the existing international litera-
ture it is impossible to affirm ex-ante what will be the effects of banking
concentration and to offer a general conclusion. Examples showing the
beneficial results of concentration are as numerous as those reaching con-
trary conclusions. Each case of a merger or acquisition has its own pecu-
liarities and, keeping those in mind, one must endeavor to extract relevant
information in order to estimate its effects on the market. This imposes se-
rious challenges to government regulatory institutions, since it does not al-
low for the definition of a standardized line of action.
3. BANKING INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DENATIONALIZATION
In countries having a banking system composed of institutions directed to-
ward a domestic market of small size by international standards, and/or of
lower efficiency when compared to their foreign counterparts, it is probable
that banking deregulation accompanied by liberalization of the entry of for-
eign institutions will provoke not only concentration but also banking de-
nationalization. That process occurred, for instance, in several Latin-
American countries during the 1990s, Argentina and Mexico being the
most outstanding cases (Goldberg et alii, 2000).
As analyzed before, changes in information and payments technologies
have broadened the economies of scale and scope available to banking ac-
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tivities. Simultaneously, several national markets became too small to allow
banks to make use of such economies in an efficient and wiser manner. This
forced them to seek external markets, whether in developed or developing
countries, where they could vie for potentially important customers with
domestic banks.
In the case of developed countries, this motivation came from objectives
of pure and simple geographical expansion as well as from the opening of
profitable opportunities in those countries, in addition to the search for the
bigger customers to be found therein. Consequently, even banks acting
in large national markets were forced to react as their national territories
were more subjected to foreign competition. From this point of view, the
very survival of banking institutions in national markets became funda-
mentally dependent on their global competitive capacity. Moreover, as
stated before, there is the fact that financial institutions with geographical
diversification seem to show a better performance in the expected risk-re-
turn mix (Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; Hughes & Mester, 1998; Hughes et alii,
1999).
Apparently, those aspects and reasons permitted financial institutions
to overcome eventual difficulties to manage and supervise their activities
in other countries, given that those activities involve dealing with differ-
ent cultures, currencies, regulation systems, etc. However, it should be
clear that this effort is probably being motivated by greater return pros-
pects as well as by the need to ensure the survival of the institution in ev-
ery local sphere through this international expansion, or, when this
movement is motivated by local governments, even by the very need to
preserve the stability of domestic financial systems under the rule of
those governments. Therefore, governmental authorities responsible for
regulating the sector must be aware of the prevalence of each of those cir-
cumstances and ponder over the potential implications of each choice for
the future course of the economy. We now present three important is-
sues for this evaluation.
Some papers (Berger et alii, 1998, 1999; Clarke et alii, 1999) have
shown that financial institutions acting simultaneously in different coun-
tries try to concentrate their business and obtain their income by catering
to the needs of large customers, who represent the most profitable share of
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the market, and by assigning a secondary role to smaller ones, who gener-
ally demand only traditional products and services. Thus, to the negative
effects on smaller investors and/or loan takers which arise from banking
concentration we should add those of banking denationalization. Such ef-
fects obviously cause more concern when the country in question does not
have a large and sound capital market granting easy access to the smaller
economic agents, or when the country has no alternative channels of
credit supply, such as cooperative systems, state or public financing agen-
cies etc. Among other effects, the reduction of credit channels to small
firms might mean that fewer business opportunities will be exploited by
these corporations and that there will be greater economic concentration.
Keeping those issues in mind, it is thus necessary to determine whether the
decrease in the cost of capital for large institutions will offset the loss in-
curred by smaller enterprises and create a positive general impact on the
rates of economic growth. Denationalization and banking concentration
will otherwise hinder the course of the country’s economic growth.
Another aspect that deserves attention in discussing the process of inter-
nationalization and consolidation of the banking sector is its impact on the
channels of transmission of monetary policy. In a banking system com-
posed mainly of small-sized national banks, as judjed by international stan-
dards, the monetary authority has greater capacity to influence the
economy through changes in the basic interest rates and/or in the supply of
banking reserves (Kashyap & Stein, 1997a, 1997b). This occurs because of
its control over the sources of banking reserves to which banks have access,
hvfence making them more sensitive to monetary policy indications in or-
der to define their strategies of supplying credit to their customers. But,
with the consolidation and internationalization of the banking system, it
gets to be formed by institutions with plenty of access to the international
credit market, even through the issuance of securities. In other words, the
banking system turns up to be made of institutions which are less depen-
dent on banking “funds” controlled by the domestic monetary authority,
and it therefore has more freedom to define its credit policies. This argu-
ment could be reinforced by the fact that foreign banks have the possibility
to be more receptive to market indicators, supplying credit when market
opportunities seem to be profitable ex ante, even within a context of restric-
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tive monetary policies or during unfavorable domestic business cycles.
Analysis of data on the Mexican and Argentinian banking systems confirms
such a possibility (Goldberg et alii, 2000).
There is also the possibility that the entry of foreign banking and finan-
cial institutions, with the resulting banking denationalization, will render
developing countries more fragile in the face of external impacts, due to the
greater availability of channels for capital outflows from the countries in
question. Some papers evidence that financial crises are preceded by mea-
sures of financial liberalization (Caprio & Hanson, 1999; Kaminsky &
Reinhart, 1999). Nevertheless, Demirgüç-Kunt et alii (1998) show that, be-
tween 1988 and 1995, the incidence of banking crises was less conspicuous
precisely in countries where the entry of foreign banks was greater. Even so,
the possibility that foreign banks can provide wider channels for inflows
and, more important, outflows of capitals when faced with economic crises
cannot be dismissed, though it is also admissible, at least in theory, that they
accelerate the return of countries to the international capital markets in the
post crisis period.
In short, banking denationalization does not imply only one range of
possible consequences, regardless of the country under consideration. On
the contrary: we should make a case by case study of the potential conse-
quences of each individual example, starting from the analysis of as many
intervening factors as possible and, most especifically, of the credit market
structure of the country in question.
4. CLOSING CONSIDERATIONS
In view of what has been discussed throughout this paper, the complexity of
financial consolidation in different countries becomes evident. If measures
of liberalization and financial deregulation have redefined the competition
locus, technological innovations and new demands for financial services
have made these loci even more attractive to banking institutions. They have
also increased the competitive advantage of large banking institutions, un-
leashing a chain of mergers and acquisitions which created mega-banks op-
erating in different markets and financial businesses.
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The impacts of this phenomenon come in several dimensions. While re-
ducing the costs of development and distribution of financial services as
well as the risks in bank portfolios, banking concentration does not result a
priori in better conditions for the users of these services, especially those
pertaining to the retail market, given that such economies of scale may be
accompanied by greater market power. Furthermore, large banks seem to
give priority to wholesale market customers who usually demand more so-
phisticated products with greater “value added”. Thus, the risk exists that
smaller economic agents will have their channels of access to credit reduced
and probably incur a loss of investment opportunities.
The challenge to the authorities responsible for this sector is to devise
regulations which can exercise pressure so that banks will comply with their
function as efficient providers of financial services even to small customers
in an environment of competitive pressure, and which at the same time will
give banking institutions installed in national markets enough freedom to
implement strategies that may guarantee their competitiveness also in the
international sphere. Accordingly, authorities responsible for this industry
must also consider the question of the risks incurred by consolidated banks,
for as seen above, being goaded among other things by their status as insti-
tutions that are “too big to fail”, these banks can increase systemic risk. The
scenario becomes even more complex when the process of banking consoli-
dation converges toward a process of banking denationalization. As dis-
cussed previously, this kind of developments bear upon the mechanisms of
transmission of monetary policy and upon control of the flows of interna-
tional capital.
Finally, since we are dealing with a segment that is strategic in the defi-
nition of the future economic growth of nations, the policies directed to-
ward the financial services sector must be implemented with caution and
within a pre-established sequence, even in regard to the timing of their
adoption, always evaluating the effects of each measure taken. If there is a
consensus, it is that the need exists for greater coordination among coun-
tries in the setup and management of prudential regulation/supervision
systems, along with an efficient establishment of safety networks for finan-
cial activities.
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ANNEX
Graph 1: Ten Largest Banks by Market Capitalization
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Table 1: Crossborder Acquisitions and Mergers of Banks
and Private Insurance Companies (1989-1996)
Value of transacions (in US$ billions)
Major* Total 1989 = 100
1989  7.216  7.216  100
1990  5.524  9.114  126
1991  2.965  6.073  84
1992  11.435  13.432  186
1993  5.651  10.134  140
1994  5.032  6.961  96
1995  14.478  16.805  233
1996  14.296  21.303  295
Source: World Investment Report (1997).
*Transactions involving major acquisition.
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Table 3: Mergers and Acquisitions in the Banking Sector (1991-1998)
Number of transactions (1) Value of transactions (2) Percentage
(US$ billions) of all sectors (3)
1991 1993 1995 1997 1991 1993 1995 1997 1991 1993 1995 1997
–1992 –1994 –1996 –1998 –1992 –1994 –1996 –1998 –1992 –1994 –1996 –1998
United 1.354  1.477  1.803  1.052 56,8 55,3 114,9 362,4 10,7 9,0 10,6 18,2
States
Japan  22  8  14  28 0,0 2,2 34,0 1,1 0,3 18,8 21,6 4,1
Euro  495  350  241  203 17,5 14,6 19,1 100,4 8,3 9,3 11,2 27,1
Area (4)
Belgium  22  18  20  21 1,0 0,8 0,5 32,5 14,1 7,0 4,9 34,8
Finland  51  16  7  7 0,9 1,0 1,2 4,3 22,3 21,7 7,4 77,5
France  133  71  50  36 2,4 0,5 6,5 4,0 4,3 1,0 9,8 4,1
Germany  71  83  36  45 3,5 1,9 1,0 23,2 6,5 7,6 3,7 45,5
Italy  122  105  93  55 5,3 6,1 5,3 30,1 15,6 17,7 24,9 63,3
Holland  20  13  8  9 0,1 0,1 2,2 0,4 0,2 0,5 17,5 0,8
Spain  76  44  27  30 4,3 4,5 2,3 5,9 13,5 21,5 14,1 26,6
Norway  23  24  9  5 0,1 0,2 1,0 1,5 1,2 5,7 8,0 20,0
Sweden  38  23  8  8 1,1 0,4 0,1 2,1 3,8 2,0 0,3 7,1
Switzerland 47  59  28  22 0,4 3,9 1,0 24,3 9,5 43,4 2,4 78,3
United  71  40  25  17 7,5 3,3 22,6 11,0 6,5 3,4 10,4 4,0
Kingdom
Australia  19  20  18  14 0,9 1,5 7,3 2,3 3,6 5,7 14,3 4,9
Canada  29  31  16  11 0,5 1,8 0,1 29,1 1,9 4,1 1,6 34,4
Total of banks
2.098 2.032 2.162 1.360 84,7 83,2 200,8 534,2 11,7 8,5 11,0 18,9
Total of  non bank finan. Inst.
2.723 3.267 3.973 5.156 63,7 1.22,2 89,9 .. 8,8 12,5 10,4 19,4
Source: Securities Data Company.
(1) Per target sector. (2) Transactions realized and pending, by announced value. (3) Share of banking sector in the total M & A
value of all sectors. (4) Excluding Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal.
Table 2: Large Mergers in the Banking Sector
Institutions Value of the transaction Date Total assets*
(U$ bilhões)
Nations Bank / BankAmerica 42,8 Sep. 1998 570
Citicorp / Travelers 37,4 Sep. 1998 751
BNP / SG Paribas 37,2 pending 1170
Royal Bank of Scotland / National Westminster 33,9 Feb. 2000 ..
Mitsubishi / Bank of Tokyo 33,8 Mar. 1996 980
Wells Fargo / Norwest 32,3 Oct. 1998 191
Union Bank of Switzerland / Swiss Bank Corp. 29,3 Jun. 1998 600
TSB / Lloyds Bank 20,1 Dec. 1995 410
Bank One / First Chicago NBD 18,9 Jan. 1998 240
Deutsche Bank / Bankers Trust 10,1 Mai. 1999 567
HSBC / Republic New York 10,3 pending 536
Source: The Banker, 7/1999, Business Times on line, and Bankers Almanac.
*Value resulting from the sum of assets at the time of the merger (in US$ millions).
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Table 4: Banking Concentration in Selected Countries
Number of Institutions1 Rate of Share of 5 (10) largest
(%) variation institutions in total assets (%)
1980 1990 1997 1980-1997 1980 1990 1997
USA 36103 27897 22140 –20,6 9 (14) 9 (15) 17 (26)
Japan 547 605 575 –5,0 25 (40) 30 (49) 31 (51)
Euro Area 9445 8979 7040 –21,6
Austria 1595 1210 995 –17,8 40 (63) 35 (54) 44 (57)
Belgium 176 157 136 –13,4 53 (69) 48 (65) 57 (74)
Finland 631 498 341 –31,5 63 (68) 65 (69) 77 (80)
France 1033 786 567 –27,9 56 (69) 52 (66) 57 (73)
Germany 5355 4721 3577 –24,2 17 (28)
Italy 1071 1067 909 –14,8 26 (42) 24 (39) 25 (38)
Holland 200 180 169 –6,1 69 (81) 73 (84) 79 (88)
Portugal 17 33 39 18,2
Spain 357 327 307 –6,1 38 (58) 38 (58) 47 (62)
Norway 346 165 154 –6,7 63 (74) 68 (79) 59 (71)
Sweden 598 498 124 –75,1 64 (71) 70 (82) 90 (93)
Switzerland 478 499 394 –21,0 45 (56) 45 (57) 49 (62)
United Kingdom 796 665 537 –19,2 49 (66) 47 (68)
Australia 812 481 344 –28,5 62 (80) 65 (79) 69 (81)
Canada 1671 1307 942 –27,9 55 (78) 78 (93)
Source: BIS (1999).
1Deposit-taking institutions, generally including commercial banks, savings banks, and various types of mutual and cooperative
banks.
Table 5: Credit Institutions in G – 10 Countries – 1997
Market share Market share of branches
Total number Rate of Total number Rate of of 5 largest and subsidiaries
of institutions variation of branches variation total assets total assets
(%) (%) (%) no. (%)
1990 1997 1990-97 1990 1997 1990-97 1990 1997 1995 1997
Germany 4.594 3.409 –25,79 77.326 59.695 –22,8 13,9 16,1 153 4,2 4,3
Belgium 122 136 11,48 13.452 9.041 –32,79 48 57 71 28,4 36,3
Canada 2.920 2.413 –17,36 13.269 13.642 2,81 55 78 – – –
USA1 31.842 22.331 –29,87 107.703 73.538 –31,72 9 17 460 21,7 20,7
France 779 519 –33,38 42.536 46.639 9,65 52 57 305 12,2 12,2
Holland 153 127 –16,99 8.161 7.071 –13,36 73 79 49 9,7 7,7
Italy 1.065 937 –12,02 32.162 39.936 24,17 24 25 61 5,4 6,8
Japan2 6.279 4.266 –32,06 68.142 69.022 1,29 30 31 142 2,1 4,9
Unit. Kingdom 637 553 –13,19 41.431 35.234 –14,96 22 28 387 51,6 52,1
Sweden 138 125 –9,42 5.136 3.624 –29,44 70 90 18 9,8 1,6
Switzerland 458 362 –20,96 8.021 6.995 –12,79 45 49 18 11,8 –
Source: Berger et al. (2000), rearranged by the authors.
1 Does not include branches or representation offices of foreign banks.
2 Excluding credit cooperatives and other finance intermediates.
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NOTES
1. See also Shearlock (1999); Caplen (1998) and Stewart (1998).
2. Between the early 80s and 1998, the share in total deposits of the ten largest commercial
banks in the USA grew from 19% to 37% (Brewer III et al., 2000, 5).
3. In the words of an Executive of the Credit Suisse Group, European and North American
banks are in the “Age of Bankassurance” (Euromoney, 1998).
4. See, for instance, Hunter & Timme (1986); Ferrier & Lovell (1990); Hunter et al. (1990);
Noulas et alii (1990); Goldberg et al. (1991); Mester (1992); Gardner & Grace (1993);
Yuengert (1993).
5. Bauer & Ferrier (1996); Radecki et al. (1997); Berger & Mester (1997); Hancock et al.
(1999). Evidence is less conclusive regarding the presence of economies of scope in the
financial industry (Allen & Rai, 1996; Clark & Siems, 1997; Vander Vennet, 1999).
However, with the dissemination of market-based financial systems (Levine, 2000), in
which the concentration, processing and analysis of information, data and markets are
fundamental for operations such as the launching of securities, multiple banks that sup-
ply diverse financial products and act in several markets can benefit from a reduction of
maintenance costs of their information and data banks. This advantage would be added
to those arising from the sharing of physical installations and communication networks,
probably surpassing eventual diseconomies of management and/or lack of specializa-
tion.
6. See statements made in this respect by the Chairman of Westdeustsche Landesbank
(Euromoney, 1998).
7. The possibility that such innovations can also benefit smaller financial institutions can-
not be discarded, if they are able to associate with electronic payment and financial
transaction settlement networks maintenance consortia.
8. In this respect, the Dresdner Bank is planning to concentrate its banking activities out-
side Europe in the area of consulting for large companies (multinationals) and in asset
management, while keeping its traditional banking activities essentially withing the Eu-
ropean Continent (O Estado de S. Paulo, 2000).
9. Edwards & Mishkin (1995); Kwan (1998); Tiner (1999).
10. Akhavein et alii (1997); Berger & Mester (1999); Hughes et alii (1999).
11. Stewart (1998); Shearlock (1999); Guillén & Tschoegl (1999).
12. Such a conflict seems to have been responsible for the discontinuation of the merger of
the German Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, which had even been announced in the
press in March of that year (Folha de S. Paulo, 2000).
13. As explained before, this accrual in value occurs because an increased market share im-
proves future prospects of profits by financial institutions, given the possibilities of
gains of scale and scope, greater power to establish profit margins, cutting redundant
costs, a wider access to the government security network, expansion of geographical ar-
eas efficiently covered etc. (Caplen, 1998; Hufbauer & Warren, 1999).
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14. Claessens et alii (1998); Claessens & Glaessner (1999); Cetorelli & Gambera (1999);
Scholtens (2000).
15. Resti (1998); Rhoades (1998); Fried et al. (1999); Haynes & Thompson (1999).
16. As in Schumpeter (1942). This author lays emphasis on the importance of a series of
product and market organizational strategies (generically named “new combinations”)
leading to the concentration of markets (but always with the presence of counterforces
and unexpected innovations by new competitors that pressure in the opposite direction,
i.e., toward a deconcentration of markets) as the relevant competitive criterion. Effective
competitive and potential perennial pressures would thus guarantee a sufficing efficiency
of the enterprises’ structures (of any size), whether this sufficing efficiency refers to an
augmenting competition or a decreasing one. Thus, the Schumpeterian view opposes
the passive, atomistic and maximizing conventional vision of enterprises and competi-
tion. See also Nelson & Winter (1974, 1977, 1982); Hodgson (1991, 1994) and Possas et
alii (1995).
17. This increase in market power is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
18. Claessens et alii (1998); Claessens & Glaessner (1999); Cetorelli & Gambera (1999);
Scholtens (2000); Edwards & Mishkin (1995).
19. Aglietta (1998); Minsky (1993); Minsky & Whalen (1996-1997); Tobin & Ranis (1998).
For Aglietta (1998, p. 19), “(c)ontrary to what people use to say, as a moral hazard is in-
cluded in most financial contracts, to prohibit the lender of last resort is surely not the
right way to deal with this inefficiency. The proper course is to strengthen prudential
policies that can ensure a complete autonomy of action to the lender of last resort. This
implies no more than a return to the true essence of the lender of last resort: to guaran-
tee confidence in the functioning of monetary markets.” Nevertheless, one may point to
the additional difficulties of granting complete autonomy to the lender of last resort in
face of the pressures toward its action. From this result once again the high levels of
moral hazard in this particular case.
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